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1Abstract
Abstract
While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 
2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming 
policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region 
has now gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and 
beyond, not least because of security considerations. The ENP undoubtedly 
represents a step forward in the EU’s policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, yet its implementation highlights major differences between 
the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. The 
Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also 
significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which 
is now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS. The 
paper highlights five main conclusions and recommendations:
•	Political,	economic,	social	and	diplomatic	developments	in	
the South Caucasus in the 2000's highlight both diverging 
trends and the persistence of tensions between the three 
countries. They also have different aspirations vis-à-vis the 
EU and different records in ENP implementation. The EU 
should therefore mainly rely upon an individual approach 
towards each country.
•	While	bilateral	relations	should	form	the	basis	of	the	EU's	
approach, most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are not confined to national borders and 
require regional solutions. This applies primarily, but not 
exclusively, to the unresolved conflicts. The EU should 
promote targeted regional cooperation including, inter 
alia, confidence-building measures to address indirectly 
the protracted conflicts and measures supporting drivers of 
change, which play a critical role in the confidence-building 
process;
•	Under	the	ENP,	especially	since	the	opening	of	negotiations	for	
association agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, 
trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform have 
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become prominent in the EU's relations with all three Caucasus 
countries. At the same time, the priorities identified when the 
ENP was launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, 
still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. 
The EU should more clearly prioritise good governance and 
the rule of law as the basis of both the ENP and successful 
reforms;
•	In	 all	 partner	 countries	 (but	 even	 more	 so	 in	 the	 South	
Caucasus), ENP implementation has been adversely affected 
by poor administrative capacities and weak institutional 
coordination. The EU should increasingly focus on 
institutional reform/capacity building in its support to 
partner countries and ensure that the link between the ENP 
and domestic reform processes is strengthened;
•	In	the	South	Caucasus	the	EU	has	recently	concentrated	on	
a few assistance tools such as budget support, Twinning and 
TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly bring an added 
value, they should be better combined with tools allowing 
for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors, 
e.g. EIDHR/NSA.
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Résumé
Alors que la Communication initiale de la Commission européenne, 
Une Europe élargie (mars 2003), n’incluait pas l’Arménie, la Géorgie et 
l’Azerbaïdjan dans la future politique de voisinage de l’Union européenne, 
le Caucase du sud est désormais une zone stratégique dans le cadre de 
la PEV et au-delà, notamment pour des raisons sécuritaires. La PEV 
représente sans aucun doute une avancée dans la politique de l’UE à 
l’égard de l’Arménie, de la Géorgie et de l’Azerbaïdjan; pourtant, sa mise en 
œuvre reflète des différences majeures entre les trois pays et d’importantes 
faiblesses dans chacun d’entre eux. Le Partenariat oriental tente de pallier 
certaines d’entre elles et il renforce aussi sensiblement l’offre européenne 
aux pays du Caucase du sud, désormais au même niveau que celle 
proposée à l’Ukraine et à la Moldavie. Cet article avance cinq conclusions 
et recommandations:
•	L'évolution	politique,	économique,	sociale	et	diplomatique	du	
Caucase du sud au cours des années 2000 met en lumière des 
tendances à la différenciation et la persistance de tensions entre 
les trois pays. Ceux-ci ont également des aspirations diverses 
à l'égard de l'UE et présentent un bilan contrasté dans la mise 
en  œuvre de la PEV. L'Union européenne devrait donc se 
fonder essentiellement sur une approche individuelle à l’égard 
de chaque pays;
•	Bien	que	les	relations	bilatérales	doivent	former	le	cœur	de	
l'approche européenne, la plupart des défis auxquels sont 
confrontés l'Arménie, la Géorgie et l'Azerbaïdjan exigent 
des solutions régionales. Ceci vaut en particulier (mais pas 
seulement) pour les conflits non résolus. L'Union européenne 
devrait donc promouvoir une coopération régionale ciblée, 
notamment par des mesures visant à renforcer la confiance 
pour aborder indirectement les conflits, et  par des mesures 
appuyant les agents de changement dans  les trois pays;
•	Dans	 le	 cadre	 de	 la	 PEV,	 notamment	 depuis	 l'ouverture	
des négociations pour des accords d'association et avec la 
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perspective d'une zone de libre-échange approfondi, les 
questions commerciales et la réforme réglementaire ont acquis 
une place centrale dans les relations de l'UE avec les pays du 
Caucase. En même temps, les priorités identifiées lors de la 
création de la PEV, c'est-à-dire la bonne gouvernance et l'Etat 
de droit, sont toujours pertinentes et correspondent à des défis 
majeurs dans le Caucase du sud. L'UE devrait plus clairement 
les placer en tête de ses priorités, en indiquant qu’il s’agit là de 
bases nécessaires au succès des réformes comme de la PEV; 
•	Dans	tous	les	pays	partenaires	,	et	plus	encore	dans	le	Caucase,	
la mise en œuvre de la PEV a été affectée par le manque de 
capacités administratives et les déficiences de la coordination 
institutionnelle. L'Union européenne devrait se concentrer 
encore davantage, dans ses programmes d'assistance, sur 
la réforme administrative et le renforcement des capacités 
institutionnelles. Elle devrait également veiller à ce que le 
lien entre la PEV et le processus de réformes internes soit 
renforcé;
•	Dans	le	Caucase	du	sud,	l'Union	européenne	se	tourne	de	
plus en plus vers des instruments d'assistance tels que l'appui 
budgétaire, Twinning et TAIEX. Bien que ces instruments 
soient incontestablement pertinents, leur utilisation devrait 
être davantage conjuguée avec celle d’outils permettant une plus 
grande flexibilité et visant les acteurs non gouvernementaux, 
par exemple l’EIDHR ou NSA. 
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1.  ENP Implementation in the South Caucasus:
      Regional Context, Challenges and Approach
While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 
2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming 
policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region has 
now also gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and 
beyond. This section will analyse the way in which the EU has become 
involved in the South Caucasus and the way in which it deals with regional 
challenges, more specifically under the ENP.
1.1 The Rise of South Caucasus on the EU’s Agenda
1.1.1 The 1990’s: the EU’s Progressive Involvement in the Region
Like other post-Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
experienced a difficult political and economic transition following the 
dismantlement of the Soviet Union. In addition, they were confronted to 
the consequences of the conflicts that burst out at the beginning of the 
1990’s, e.g. political and economic instability as well as a high number of 
Internally Displaced Persons.
Assistance as the Core EU Instrument in the 1990’s
In this context, the EU became progressively engaged through the first and 
second TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent 
States) programmes. In the South Caucasus, TACIS priorities varied 
significantly from one country to another: whereas emphasis has been put 
on the justice sector reforms in Georgia, the funds allocated to Armenia 
were mainly targeted at the education sector and the securitization of 
the Medzamor nuclear power plant (built on a seismic zone). Assistance 
to Azerbaijan was concentrated mostly on border management. The 
first attempts to develop a regional approach also took place during this 
6Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful?
period in the sector of transports (with the Traceca East-West Corridor 
programme in 1993) and in the energy field (Inogate programme in 
1995).
The EU has also provided assistance to South Caucasus countries using 
specific EC aid mechanisms outside the TACIS framework, such as the 
Food Security Programme (for the benefit of Armenia or Georgia) or 
humanitarian aid managed by the European Commission Humanitarian 
office (ECHo), especially in the case of Georgia. This assistance stems from 
the challenges specifically faced by South Caucasus countries, whereas 
TACIS is meant to support the overall economic and political transition 
process in all CIS countries. on the whole, estimates suggest that the EU 
allocated over a billion euro to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia from 
1991 to 2000 (Coppieters 2003: 161).
Thus, assistance has been the major instrument of EU activity in the 
South Caucasus in the decade following the collapse of the USSR. The 
new contractual framework (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
signed in 1996) indeed came into force at the end of the decade, in 1999. 
overall, the EU’s policy toolbox (in particular, the level of relations 
foreseen under the PCA) indicates that in comparison to the Western 
NIS, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan ranked low on the EU agenda in 
the former USSR.
A Weak EU Involvement in Security Issues
By contrast to its humanitarian and assistance engagement in the South 
Caucasus, the EU was not directly involved in security and conflict 
resolution issues, which were central in the 1990’s. Such weak involvement 
can be explained by both external and internal factors. The latter pertain 
to the lack of a policy toolbox by that time; while the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy was created in the early 1990’s, developments on a 
security and defence policy did not take place until the end of the decade. 
As far as external factors are concerned, a number of international actors 
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and organisations had been present in the region since the collapse of the 
USSR, which strongly constrained the EU’s engagement. Whereas Russia 
has continuously played a major role in all three main regional conflicts 
(Abkhazia, South ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh), the negotiation 
mechanisms introduced for each of those also involved the United Nations 
(UN Group of Friends in the case of Abkhazia) or the organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (oSCE, in the case of South ossetia or 
Nagorno-Karabakh). Therefore, few options for a strong EU engagement 
existed. Moreover, since the early 1990s, the EU has been present in 
negotiation processes through its member states. France co-chairs (with 
the US and Russia) the Minsk Group created by the oSCE to negotiate 
a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem; the Group also 
includes other EU member states, namely Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden and Finland. Germany, France and the UK (together 
with Russia and the US), which participate in the UN Group of Friends 
of the Secretary General for Abkhazia.
1.1.2 A Growing EU Engagement under the ENP
In March 2003, the communication on Wider Europe excluded Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan from the new proximity policy to be developed by 
the EU. Such exclusion was justified by geographical reasons (the region 
had no direct land or sea borders with the EU in 2003).
South Caucasus started nonetheless to attract a growing interest within the 
EU, not least for security considerations. In December 2000, the European 
Parliament called for the creation of a “Southern Dimension” around the 
Black Sea (modelled on the “Northern Dimension” designed around the 
Baltic Sea). In july 2003, a EU Special Representative, Heikki Talvitie, was 
appointed with a regional mandate, in an attempt to foster EU political 
involvement in the region. The Rose revolution, which paved the way for 
both an ambitious package of reforms and a new foreign policy orientation, 
was a watershed in this process. Six months later, the Commission, 
backed by the European Parliament, recommended the inclusion of the 
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3 South-Caucasus countries into the ENP, a recommendation which was 
adopted by the Council in june 2004. Interestingly, such inclusion targeted 
all three countries and not Georgia alone, thus reflecting the EU’s approach 
of South Caucasus as a region.
Under the ENP umbrella, the EU has been increasingly present in the 
South Caucasus, inter alia through the signature of the three bilateral 
action plans in November 2006 and through the opening of a Regional 
Delegation in Tbilisi (2005), then of two Delegations concomitantly in 
Baku and Yerevan (2008). The EU’s enhanced presence is also reflected 
in the amount of financial assistance, which has considerably increased 
under the ENPI as compared to TACIS (e.g. under National Indicative 
Programme for 2007-2010 € 98 million allocated to Armenia, € 92 million 
to Azerbaijan and € 120,4 to Georgia).
1.1.3 Other “Players” in the Region 
The context in which the ENP is implemented is also shared, to a 
considerable extent, by other international players present in the South 
Caucasus. The region indeed concentrates strategic opportunities (as an 
energy corridor) as well as security challenges (in terms of fight against 
international crime and terrorism).
In this respect, the United States has been extremely active, notably under 
the Bush administration. It has indeed a strong leverage in the region, thanks 
to military cooperation – notably through NATo and the Partnership for 
Peace signed in 2002 - and economic and financial assistance. The US 
also exercises a strong political and diplomatic influence, especially in 
Georgia whose authorities have sent troops to Iraq and to Afghanistan. A 
shift has, however, been noted under the obama administration, with a 
renewed focus on promoting dialogue with the Southern Caucasus’ two 
big neighbours: Russia and Turkey.
A regional player itself, Russia is also obviously one of the key international 
powers with a direct geographic and political stake in a region that was 
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part of the Soviet Union. Russian has military bases in Armenia and in the 
separatist Georgian entities. The region is also central to Russian energetic 
edge. In terms of security, Russia considers the Southern-Caucasus as a 
backyard for “terrorist” groups present in the North-Caucasus, notably in 
Chechnya or in Dagestan. This very significant stake has been blatantly 
illustrated by the August 2008 conflict in Georgia and the subsequent 
recognition of Abkhazia and South-ossetia independence.
Iran and Turkey also play an increasing economic and cultural role in the 
region. Turkey, as an EU candidate country, might also constitute a strong 
ally as well as powerful relay for EU policy in the region.
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1.2 Regional Approach vs. Differentiation
In this section, we will examine the EU’s approach towards Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in the framework of the ENP, which can be 
apprehended as a mix between regional approach and differentiation. The 
EU’s twofold objective to promote regional cooperation and to differentiate 
between partner countries according to their reform progress lies at the 
basis of the ENP as a whole; however, these two dimensions (and tensions 
arising between them) are even more apparent when it comes to the South 
Caucasus.
The three Southern Caucasus countries are extremely different in terms 
of historical and cultural legacies, as reflected in their self-perceptions. 
Armenia has historically viewed itself as a Christian stronghold amid 
ottoman and Persian influences. The diaspora – in particular in the 
US and in Europe - continues to play a significant role in defining the 
country’s foreign policy, not least by exerting a strong financial influence 
through remittances. Georgia is a multi-ethnic country with strong 
regional identities. At the same time, while it has experienced very 
tense relations with Russia climaxing in the August 2008 conflict, it has 
undergone a rapid process of modernization following Western standards 
and models. It is also the only country with a direct maritime access to 
Europe. Azerbaijan appears as a particular case as a country maintaining 
relatively good relations with both Russia and the EU while relying on its 
energy resources (more specifically with the prospect of the exploitation 
of the Shahdeniz II). The Southern-Caucasus has been historically viewed 
as a “melting-pot” of various cultural habits, ethnicities and religions; 
and the presence of strong national neighbouring minorities in all three 
countries still validates this picture today. However, following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, clashing territorial ambitions and nationalist claims 
have resulted in three conflicts: in Abkhazia, South-ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan de facto blocks 
any attempt to create fully integrated regional networks amidst the three 
countries, and seriously impedes transportation and trade flows. Due to 
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its long-lasting dispute with Turkey, Armenia appears even more isolated 
and such isolation has serious economic consequences, as goods exported 
to Armenia by land or sea have to transit through Georgia.
Under the ENP, the EU has so far prioritised a regional approach towards 
South Caucasus, for a number of reasons. First of all, any conflict settlement, 
by nature, implies a global approach encompassing the different belligerents. 
Second, natural opportunities and threats (energy, environment but also 
natural disasters) can only be managed at a regional level. Third, due to the 
limited size of South Caucasus countries and to their strategic location, any 
sustainable economic development should foster mutual exchanges and 
trade – and at the same time it may also promote a healthy “emulation” 
between the three countries. The EU’s regional approach is illustrated by 
several examples: for instance, the signature of all three action plans was 
delayed in 2005-2006 due to the opening of a commercial line between 
Baku and Northern Cyprus (and in spite of the protests of Georgia and 
Armenia). In a similar vein, fully-fledged delegations in Baku and Yerevan 
were opened quasi-simultaneously, in order to avoid a political asymmetry 
between the two sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Nevertheless, partner countries’ expectations towards the ENP appear 
to be quite different. Georgia clearly considers the ENP as a path 
towards European and even EU integration, with major milestones and 
achievements (opening of the Association Agreement negotiations, opening 
of the DCFTA negotiations, signature of an air transport agreement for 
integration into the European common aviation market etc.). Armenia has 
developed a rather pragmatic approach with a clear focus on economic 
cooperation. Azerbaijan, also because of the strong stance it enjoys owing 
to its natural resources, has much more limited expectations towards the 
ENP. Whereas expectations vis-à-vis the ENP differ, perceptions towards 
regional cooperation appear contradictory. While Armenia may consider 
regional programmes under the ENP as a means to overcome its isolation, 
it remains opposed to Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
to Turkey over a historic controversy. Azerbaijan has so far refused to take 
12
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part in any regional programme with Armenia. Even though it also sends 
clear signal to Turkish and Middle-Eastern investors, Georgia has chosen 
a clear focus on Europe and the Black Sea region and therefore considers 
itself as intrinsically different from the two other countries.
As a consequence, the three action plans signed with the EU, while 
explicitly ambitioning to foster regional cooperation, set hardly compatible 
objectives. Whereas the EU-Armenia Action Plan recalls the principle of 
self-determination, the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan insists on territorial 
integrity. Even though these divergences can be easily explained by 
bilateral negotiation processes, they undermine the promotion of regional 
cooperation through the ENP. Conflict settlement and regional or cross-
border cooperation are the best illustrations of such challenges.
13
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1.3 The ENP in View of the “Frozen Conflicts”
The term “frozen conflicts” in itself may appear misleading, when one 
considers the August 2008 war in Georgia or the persisting tensions – both 
in rhetorical terms and on the ground - between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over the Nagorno-Karabakh. It reflects, however, the regional situation 
where parts of the territory are still hardly, if at all, accessible, and where 
inter-state relations have been constantly affected over the past 20 years  
(De Wall 2004).
In a region marked by numerous influences (Persian, ottoman, Russian) 
over the past centuries and by rapid political changes at the beginning of 
the 1900’s, the so-called frozen conflicts appear deeply rooted while, at 
the same time, a long tradition of cultural proximity and multiculturalism 
still exists. Centuries of shared history have also resulted in the presence 
of national minorities in all three countries (notably Armenian and 
Azerbaijanis minorities in Georgia, respectively in Djavakhetie and in 
Kvemo-Kartli). Last but not least, the issue of Internally Displaced Persons 
(“IDPs”) resulting from the conflict in the 1990’s and in 2008 have made 
any settlement more difficult. In Georgia, the government reported 236,000 
IDPs from the conflicts in the 1990s’ and 22,000 displaced in the wake of 
the 2008 war. In Azerbaijan, no less than 593,000 IDPs are reported.
As stated in the European Security Strategy in 2003 and then in ENP core 
policy documents, conflict prevention and conflict settlement constitute 
primary objectives of the EU policy in its neighbourhood. From the 
late 1990’s, the EU has been the biggest donor in Abkhazia and South-
ossetia (if one excludes Russia’s direct or indirect financial assistance). The 
appointment of the European Union Special Representative and the use of 
the Instrument for Stability (IFS) have also illustrated EU’s involvement 
towards conflict resolution (Di Puppo 2007). As indicated above, the EU 
is also present (as such or through its Member States) in the peace talks 
and fora designed to foster a settlement of the three conflicts, either within 
the Minsk group format or within the current Geneva talks.
14
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The EU’s involvement has considerably increased with the August 2008 
war in Georgia and the following recognition of the separatist entities 
by Russia. The French Presidency of the EU played a very active role, 
brokering the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement. In the conflict’s immediate 
aftermath, the Brussels donors conference under the aegis of the EU, 
which agreed on additional financial support for Georgia, and the rapid 
deployment of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), have 
clearly illustrated the active stance taken by the EU. one can however point 
out that most EU actions dedicated to conflict settlement at a political level 
in the region have taken place outside of the ENP direct scope, as is the 
case for the EUSR office and for EUMM.
The role of the ENP has been limited in this respect for three reasons. First, 
in operational terms, circulation in the separatist entities (in Georgia but also 
in the Karabkh region) has proven very difficult and partnership-building 
activities between the two sides of the conflicts appear therefore extremely 
difficult to carry out. Second, due to the nature of the conflicts at stake, the 
ENP does not seem fully equipped to deal with what one may call confidence 
and security building measures programmes, which also require a very high 
level of diplomatic, political and military attention. The third reason is related 
to the design of the ENP as such, which is legally based on bilateral agreements 
and focuses on internal reforms undertaken by each specific country.
In this respect, one could argue that the added value of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in terms of conflict management stems mostly 
from its capacity to promote internal reforms and to foster political 
dialogue. In the case of Georgia, the intensive dialogue launched with 
the donor community over the so-called “law on occupied territories” 
has shown to some extent how bilateral assistance and regular policy 
dialogue allow for donors’ direct involvement, which may not have been 
possible otherwise.
In addition, even though being an umbrella of bilateral agreements, the 
ENP also encompasses a clear regional dimension. The launch of the Black 
15
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Sea Synergy in April 2007 and, more significantly perhaps, the launch of 
the Eastern Partnership in 2009, have sent clear signals in this respect. 
The two initiatives also build on the principle that regional cooperation 
and joint projects in various fields, such as environment or economy 
(Wittich and Maas 2009), may constitute confidence building measures 
as such (European Parliament 2011), while they offer a platform for a more 
institutionalized and sustainable dialogue at a regional level.
16
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1.4  Regional Programmes and Cross-Border Cooperation: 
Overview and Prospects
Despite the difficulties stemming from the tense relations between South 
Caucasus countries, the ENP has succeeded in achieving some positive 
results, more specifically through a sector-based approach. other schemes 
could prove successful in overcoming the existing barriers, both at a local 
level and from a wider regional perspective, possibly through reinforced 
joint-initiatives with Turkey.
The so-called ENP East region encompasses the three South-Caucasus 
states, plus Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Due to their geographical 
location and political aspiration towards greater political engagement, 
these states occupy a very specific place in the overall framework of EU 
external policies. Regional programmes and projects in the East tackle 
the following six areas of cooperation: transport, energy-sustainable 
management of natural resources, borders-migration-customs-fight 
against international crime, people-to-people activities, landmines-
explosive remnants of war and light weapons. These objectives reflect the 
wide scope of EU cooperation in the Eastern region.
From the overall ENP funding of roughly € 12 billions for the period 
2007-2013, the ENP East region has received approximately one third of 
the bilateral allocation. overall, 10% of the ENPI envelope is dedicated to 
regional programmes. In addition, an envelope of more than € 1 billion is 
dedicated to cross-border-cooperation (CBC) and covers specifically the 
Black Sea Basin programme. The CBC programme targets directly so-
called grass-root organizations in the fields of environment, local economic 
development, tourism promotion, people-to-people contacts and the list 
is not exhaustive. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility has also proved 
to be an efficient instrument in promoting regional initiatives, for instance 
through the € 300 millions allocation dedicated in 2009 to the Black Sea 
Energy Transmission System project, which aims at interconnecting the 
electricity grids in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.
17
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These regional programmes roughly pursue two main strategic objectives: 
1) to foster the creation or the reinforcement of regional networks and 
2) to tackle issues of a transnational nature. one could add that regional 
programmes may also be viewed as confidence-building measures 
between the three South Caucasus countries. As far as the first objective 
is concerned, the Black Sea Synergy aims at promoting region-wide 
sector partnerships in the field of environment, transport or energy. It 
complements the establishment of networks already foreseen under 
Traceca (for instance, through the “Interoperability of Motorways of the 
Sea 2009-2011” project) or under Inogate (with the Trans-Caspian-Black 
Sea Gas Corridor). The Trans-boundary management of the Kura river 
project, which covers the three South Caucasus countries, also constitutes 
a clear example of how regional environmental protection may contribute 
to regional cooperation.
In spite of the initiatives, it proves however difficult to promote inter-
state cooperation between the three countries, due more specifically to 
the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For instance, support 
to integrated border management system (SCIBM) provided by the EU 
allows for the organization of joint trainings but joint activities on the 
ground are implemented bilaterally (cooperation between Armenia and 
Georgia, and between Georgia and Azerbaijan).
Among the lessons learnt from ENP implementation in the South-
Caucasus, the potential of regional programmes and cross-border-
cooperation projects as confidence-building measures to foster region-
wide cooperation can however be pointed out. In this respect, a stronger 
focus could be put upon drivers of change, such as local authorities, 
business entrepreneurs and civil society. Fostering the projects involving 
minorities, for instance Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities in Georgia, 
could bear fruits in this respect. With the emergence of the European 
External Action Service, potentialities also exist to better align cooperation 
under the ENPI with the dialogue conducted in the framework of the 
political fora, such as the Minsk group or the Geneva talks.
18
Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful?
As it has been underlined by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament, the role of Turkey as a potential mediator for EU 
cooperation in the region may also be reinforced, through the creation of 
a EU stability pact for the southern Caucasus, which would also involve 
Russia, the US and the UN in order to foster regional cooperation and 
conflict settlement1. overall, the idea to involve Turkey in some regional 
programmes conducted by the EU find echoes both at a political level and 
at a technical level, through the greater participation of Turkey in cross-
border-cooperation programmes in the South-Caucasus.
overall, the ENP has set a basis for regional cooperation in the 
South Caucasus, notably at sector level. This dimension has also been 
reinforced thanks to the Black Synergy and the Eastern Partnership 
initiatives. This dimension ought to be preserved and reinforced under 
the next financial perspectives. Potentialities for greater cooperation 
both at macro (through a reinforced involvement of Turkey) and at a 
micro-level (via the participation of local authorities for instance) should 
not be underestimated. By putting regional cooperation clearly at the center 
of its focus, the ENP may also become a very powerful tool = together with 
a greater political involvement - to foster a settlement of the protracted 
conflicts in the medium run.
1  European Parliament, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Press release 20100406IPR72190, 
8 April 2010.
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2.  ENP Implementation:  
Sector Assessment and Case Studies
This chapter will examine in detail the ENP activities supporting good 
governance, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in all three 
Caucasus countries. The selection of these issue areas stems from the 
following reasons: First, whereas Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
face different situations on a number of ENP priority areas, these are 
major challenges for all three Caucasus countries, although to a different 
extent. Second, good governance, democracy and the rule of law have 
been EU top priorities in the South Caucasus ever since the three 
countries were included in the ENP; both the time period considered 
and the level of EU involvement are therefore sufficient to draw lessons 
from policy implementation. Third, these are also the issue areas where 
the EU has mobilized a wider array of instruments. Therefore, they are 
found particularly relevant to assess the ENP’s record in South Caucasus 
countries.
2.1  Brief Overview of the Pre-ENP Situation  
in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
When Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were included in the ENP in 2004, 
they indeed faced major governance challenges, including the following:
•	 lack	of	democratic	traditions	and	Soviet-style	political	system	
and leadership,
•	absence	of	a	viable	civil	society	(again	with	the	exception,	to	
some extent, of Georgia),
•	major	human	rights	abuses	(e.g.	torture),
•	endemic	corruption.
In the early 2000’s, the Soviet legacy was still deeply rooted in South 
Caucasus countries’ political system, characterized by a strong executive 
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branch, weak Parliaments and opposition parties, clan politics, widespread 
frauds during elections. Whereas Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan had 
respectively gained access to the Council of Europe in 1996, 1999 and 
2001, the presidential or parliamentary elections that took place in all three 
countries in 2003 were clear, though diverging in their results, illustrations 
of the Soviet political inheritance being a barrier to democratisation.
The February-March election in Armenia resulted in the reelection of 
President Kocharian, who had concentrated power in his hands following 
the attack on the Armenian National Assembly in 1999. Both the presidential 
election and the May parliamentary vote were criticized by international 
observers for not meeting democratic standards. In Georgia, a similar scenario 
was observed during the parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003, yet 
with different results: widespread reports of fraud triggered mass public 
protests which led to the resignation of President Shevardnadze, a former 
Soviet Foreign Affairs minister (the “Rose revolution”). Whereas Georgia 
made at the end of 2003-early 2004 a decisive shift towards democratisation, 
Azerbaijan simultaneously followed an opposite path. Since 1993, following a 
military coup, the country had been ruled by the former first secretary of the 
Communist Party, Heidar Aliev, who withdrew his candidacy in favour of his 
son Ilham just a few days before october 2003 presidential elections. 
Although to a different extent, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were not 
in line with the international human and civil rights standards at the eve of 
their inclusion in the ENP. The judiciary was subject to political pressures; 
arbitrary arrests and detention, use of torture and unfair trials were 
frequently reported in all three countries, especially in Azerbaijan where 
Freedom House described the judiciary as “subservient to the executive 
branch, corrupt and inefficient”2. Media freedom was limited, with common 
self-censorship among journalists, intimidation, and economic and political 
pressure over opposition media. other rights provided for by Constitutions, 
2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 2004, retrieved at: http://www.free-
domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2004&country=2884.
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such as freedom of association, were de facto not respected.
 As a result, while Armenia and Georgia were rated as partly free countries 
by Freedom House in 2004, with political rights and civil liberties score 
of 4 each (out of 7) in both countries, owing to the flawed presidential 
elections of october 2003 Azerbaijan was downgraded to “not free” with 
a political rights score of 6 and a civil liberties score of 5.3
In addition, corruption was rampant in all three countries: Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan were respectively ranked 82th, 133th and 140th 
out of the 145 countries surveyed in Transparency International 2004 
Corruption Perception Index.4
To sum up, while all three countries shared a profound lack of legacies upon 
which democracy and the rule of law could be built, they also increasingly 
engaged into different economic and political paths at the time when the 
ENP was launched. This was especially the case for Georgia after the Rose 
Revolution.
3 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 2004, retrieved at: http://www.free-
domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=172&year=2004.
4 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2004, retrieved at: http://
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004.
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2.2  ENP Activities to Support Democratisation,  
Good Governance and the Rule of Law
The inclusion of South Caucasus countries in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy marked a significant step forward in their relations with the EU. At 
the same time, pursuing the ENP was expected to call for major economic 
and political reforms in partner countries, which the EU would support 
through financial and technical assistance, opening of markets and 
providing access to Community programmes where possible.
Support to good governance, the rule of law and democratisation has been 
constantly identified as a core priority in major policy documents in all three 
countries. In the Country Reports prepared by the European Commission 
in 2005, political, rule of law and human rights issues were highlighted as 
areas where reforms should markedly be strengthened and where cooperation 
with the EU should develop for all three Caucasus countries. They were 
subsequently identified as core priorities in the Action Plans signed with 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2006. However, table 1 below highlights 
slight differences connected to the specific situation of each country. These 
illustrate the principle of differentiation enshrined in the ENP. For example, 
political developments in Georgia in 2004-2005 confirmed progress towards 
democratisation: the elections which were held in Georgia in the wake of 
the Rose revolution (extraordinary presidential elections in january 2004, 
repeat parliamentary elections in March 2004) were assessed by international 
observers as largely fair and free. Accordingly, the Action Plan signed with 
the EU put the emphasis on consolidating such progress and focused on 
those areas which remained problematic (e.g. the rule of law). While the 
Action Plan signed with Georgia reflected the country’s progress towards 
democratisation, the document concluded with Azerbaijan included much 
more basic and general priorities, thus reflecting the country’s slower progress 
and sultanic political system. However, overall the examination of key policy 
documents shows a high degree of consistency in the EU’s prioritization of 
good governance, democratisation and the rule of law.
EU support to these priority areas was mainly provided through technical and 
financial assistance, from 2007 onwards under the European Neighbourhood 
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Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The analysis of ENPI activities in the field 
of democratization and good governance highlights both a sufficient level of 
financial commitments and the use of a wide array of assistance tools.
In all three countries, support to good governance, democratisation and 
the rule of law has been identified as a focal assistance area under National 
Indicative Programmes 2007-2010 and 2011-2013. For all three countries, 
financial commitments in this issue area have increased in 2011-2013 as 
compared to 2007-2010; however, while significant in both Armenia and 
Georgia, this increase is expected to be more limited in Azerbaijan. Support 
to good governance, democratisation and the rule of law represents between 
25% and 35% of the funds committed per country under the current indicative 
programmes. It ranks second after support to poverty reduction efforts in 
Armenia and in Georgia, while it is expected to be the least important priority 
in terms of financial commitments under the current NIP for Azerbaijan.
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
Priority 1
Strengthening of democratic 
structures, rule of law, including 
reform of the judiciary and combat of 
fraud and corruption.
Priority 2
Strengthen democracy in the 
country, including through fair and 
transparent electoral process, in line 
with international requirements
Priority 1
Strengthen rule of law through 
reform of the judicial system, 
including the penitentiary system, 
and through rebuilding state 
institutions. Strengthen democratic 
institutions and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in 
compliance with the international 
commitments of Georgia (PCA, CoE, 
OSCE, UN)
Priority 2 
Strengthening of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, 
in compliance with the international 
commitments of Armenia (PCA, CoE, 
OSCE, UN)
Priority 3
Strengthen protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, 
in compliance with the international 
commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, 
CoE, OSCE, UN)
TABLE 1.  ENP ACTION PLANS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, DEmOCRACy,  
HUmAN RIGHTS  AND THE RULE OF LAw IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
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ENPI funds have often been assessed as insufficient to effectively support 
ENP objectives. Notwithstanding these frequent negative judgments on 
ENPI overall funding, the level of financial commitments to support 
specifically good governance, the rule of law and democratisation in the 
South Caucasus is found to be consistent with the ENP general objectives 
and priorities as included in the Action Plans.
Moreover, the EU has mobilized a wide array of policy and assistance 
instruments to reach these objectives, with a view to targeting a broad 
range of beneficiaries faced with different challenges.
TABLE 2.  ENPI ASSISTANCE ON GOOD GOVERNANCE, DEmOCRACy, HUmAN RIGHTS 
AND THE RULE OF LAw IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS1
Financial commitments 
under the ENPI, €m
Part of total commitments  
under the ENPI
2007-2010 2011-2013 2007-2010 2011-2013
Armenia 29.52 47-55 30% 30-35%
Azerbaijan 30 30.5-37 33% 25-30%
Georgia 31 45-63 26,00% 25-35%
1  Figures are those provided in the National Indicative Programmes.
BOx 1.  POLICy AND ASSISTANCE mODALITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
GOOD GOVERNANCE, THE RULE OF LAw, DEmOCRATISATION 
AND HUmAN RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
BudGEt suPPort: 
Examples: public finance management in Georgia, reform of the justice sector  •	
in Azerbaijan and in Armenia
EuroPEAN sEcurIty ANd dEFENcE PolIcy 
Example: THEMIS rule of law mission in Georgia•	
AssIstANcE ProjEcts:
ENPI •	 projects
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights•	
Non-State Actors•	
Rapid Reaction Mechanism, replaced by the Instrument for Stability•	
SIGMA•	
TAIEX•	
Twinning•	
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2.3 Assessment 
our assessment of the ENP’s record in the field of good governance, 
democratisation and the rule of law will focus on the following questions: 
To what extent have assistance design and modalities proved adequate 
to support partner countries in these issue areas? Has the policy been 
effectively implemented? To what extent has the ENP contributed to 
improving democracy and the rule of law, good governance and the respect 
for human rights in the three South Caucasus countries?
Unlike the Western NIS and Ukraine in particular, sources and publications 
on ENP implementation in South Caucasus countries are sparse. More 
specifically, there is very little information available on the implementation 
of assistance activities. The recent report by the Court of Auditors on the 
launch of ENPI and its first results in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
focuses on the implementation of the first Action Programmes in a few 
areas that do no match our focus; it is however highly instructive. Under 
this section, we will therefore rely on this report and the major policy 
documents for each country, as well as on our experience in the field, and 
we will triangulate our findings with evidence available from international 
organizations and watchdogs on good governance and with findings 
published in the academic literature.
The present paper does not pretend to be a fully-fledged evaluation, which 
is not possible without dedicated visits and access to documents in the field. 
Based upon the overall policy process and specific examples, we will rather 
aspire to highlight a few lessons which can be drawn from the first four 
years of policy implementation. Those relate to the relevance of assistance 
design and modalities, the effectiveness of policy implementation and its 
effects on good governance, the rule of law and democratisation in the 
South Caucasus.
As noted above, support to good governance, the rule law, democratisation 
and human rights has figured constantly and prominently on assistance 
programming documents. In other words, prioritisation is clear and 
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consistent in both the Country Strategy Papers and the successive National 
Indicative Programmes, and it proceeds logically from the prioritisation of 
these issues in the ENP Action Plans. our analysis, then, differs from the 
Court of Auditors’ recent criticisms on the lack of clarity and prioritisation 
of assistance in the South Caucasus. In particular, unlike the Court we 
do not consider the different timeframes of assistance programming as 
being problematic. For South Caucasus countries, the entry into force of 
Action Plans (end of 2006) roughly coincides with that of CSP (2007); 
moreover, the drafting of new NIPs (which cover a four-year period) in 
2009 provided an opportunity to carry out a mid-term review of CSP and 
to adjust assistance priorities.
Nevertheless, while the upper levels of the programming cycle are found 
to be consistent, this does not seem to be the case at the lowest levels, i.e. 
at the Action Programme level and between the AP and the NIP. To our 
knowledge, based upon the scarce project information at our disposal5, 
some of the issue areas singled out as sub-priorities in the NIP, e.g. the fight 
against corruption (see box 2 below), have not been tackled directly under 
EU assistance. This indirectly confirms the Court of Auditors’ conclusion 
according to which “areas selected for assistance did not derive clearly 
enough from the programming documents’.6 The opposite phenomenon 
(i.e. priorities identified in the programming documents not being tackled 
sufficiently under areas selected for assistance) can be explained through 
several factors, e.g. limited funding capacities and the need to focus on 
the top priorities.
one of the most important explanations certainly relates to the shifting 
combination of EU assistance modalities. over the past few years, the EU 
has increasingly moved towards sector budget support as the main channel 
5 Action Programmes, which contain an annual list of projects, are not publicly available.
6 European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 13/2010 – Is the new European Neigh-
bourhood and Partnership Instrument successfully launched and achieving results in 
the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)?, january 2011, available 
at: http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/6970784.PDF.
27
2. ENP Implementation: Sector Assessment and Case Studies 
for its assistance, in line with the European Consensus on Development. 
While this instrument is meant to foster ownership by partner countries of 
sector-wide reforms, it reduces, as pointed out by the Court of Auditors, the 
visibility of EU assistance and it also suffers from shortcomings in partner 
countries, e.g. unpreparedness or reluctance of authorities. The increasing 
use of budget support also makes EU assistance less targeted at a specific 
topic, since funds are used for a sector-wide reform and even though sets 
of outputs and outcomes are agreed upon. Twinning has been introduced 
in the Action Programme 2007 as the second major assistance mechanism 
in the South Caucasus. While it is undoubtedly a promising instrument in 
the countries where institutional and administrative capacities and policy 
enforcement are problematic, the Court of Auditors points to its difficult 
beginnings, more specifically when it comes to setting up the national 
authority in charge of managing the tool.
The shift towards budget support and Twinning raises additional questions 
on the adequate balance of assistance mechanisms. As clearly evidenced by 
the implementation of EC assistance in the period 2004-2008, such a wide 
range of assistance mechanisms has been an asset for the EC to support 
democratisation, good governance and the rule of law. More specifically, 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights allows to 
target NGos which are otherwise often left out of the policy process. 
This instrument is even more important in the South Caucasus as the 
selection of priorities and projects is out of the governments’ control. The 
Rapid Reaction mechanism (replaced since 2007 by the Instrument for 
Stability), which has been used several times in Georgia in the context of 
the Rose revolution, has enabled the EC to react quickly to a fast-changing 
environment. Project aid either in the framework of TACIS or ENPI has 
also allowed to support major activities in the areas of good governance 
and rule of law. To sum up, while the introduction of new tools seems 
entirely justified, the right balance still needs to be found and the EU 
should not neglect “older” or smaller mechanisms which allow for targeted 
aid and greater flexibility.
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BOx 2. REFORm OF THE jUDICIARy
Reform of the judiciary was identified as a sub-priority in both NIP (2007-2010 and •	
2011-2013) for Armenia and €18 million have been earmarked to this task through 
budget support. While budget support represents the bulk of EC funds dedicated to 
the reform of the judiciary, other activities have been implemented. A TAIEX-funded 
workshop was organized in 2009 to explore the EU experience on judicial statistics, 
with a view to improving their use and the work of courts in Armenia. Several small-
scale projects were funded through the EIDHR, especially with a view to increasing 
protection of judicial rights and citizens’ awareness of these rights. Improving access 
to justice and education of judges was the overall objective of a large-scale ENPI 
project implemented jointly with the Council of Europe (approximately € 4 million). 
The record can be assessed as mixed. Both the PRSP, 2007–2009 Medium–Term 
Public Expenditure Framework and the EU/Armenia ENP Action Plan stressed the 
importance of a successful reform and the government's commitment to that end. 
The reform of the judiciary is still ongoing with amendments to the judicial code, law 
on procuracy and on the academy of justice being adopted in 2009 and assisted by the 
EC through sector budget support. Whereas good progress has been made through 
increasing judges’ salaries in 2009, the independence of the judiciary remains an area 
of concern, as stressed in the last EC Progress Report.
Reform of the judiciary has also been identified as a sub-priority under the •	
current Indicative Programme for Azerbaijan, where the judiciary, far from being 
strong enough to counterbalance the executive branch of power, is de facto not 
independent. The country has benefitted from € 16 million under the current 
NIP, through sector budget support. Nevertheless, the record is rather poor. 
Some progress has been made on the technical and administrative aspects of the 
reform, e.g. regarding the execution of court rulings or the selection procedures 
for judges and the Bar association. Yet, progress is found to be limited as far 
as the political aspects of reform are concerned, i.e. political pressures and 
independence of the judiciary.
Georgia is undoubtedly the country in which the EC has developed the most far-•	
reaching and strategic vision for its assistance in the rule of law area, developing 
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synergies between various instruments and complementarities between different 
projects. Under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), support was provided 
to the organisational reform of the Ministry of Justice as well as other public 
institutions (0.9m EUR). In 2004, the EU also launched EUJUST THEMIS, the 
first Rule of Law mission conducted in the context of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU Rule of Law mission advised the Government 
of Georgia in designing the Strategy for the Reform of the Criminal Legislation 
of Georgia. EC interventions under TACIS/ENPI (e.g. support to the reform of 
the Office of the Prosecutor General, strengthening the institutional capacities of 
the Ministry of Justice) contributed significantly to capacity building in the main 
justice institutions and beneficiaries of related EC projects displayed a strong sense 
of ownership. Budget support has also strengthened Georgia’s ownership of the 
reform process in the justice sector. A strong degree of complementarity between 
aid channels and modalities has been observed in EC support. For instance, RRM 
interventions were used to kick-start a reform programme. Funding under TACIS/
ENPI followed most RRM-financed projects in the rule of law area, which enhanced 
their long-term impact. TACIS was also used to follow-up on the EUJUST THEMIS 
mission to assist the Georgian authorities in developing an implementation plan 
for criminal justice reform. Complementarity also exists in the case of EIDHR that 
is designed to fulfill possible gaps in the existing programmes, facilitating direct 
cooperation with NGOs on matters related to rule of law.
However, close monitoring of this process is needed as far as the instability 
of the policy environment is likely to affect the effectiveness of EC assistance. 
This includes staff turnover at all levels, frequent organizational changes within 
key institutions, and major policy shifts in the judiciary area. For instance, 
the emphasis put on juvenile justice in the 2011-2013 NIP stems from policy 
shifts which resulted in moving Georgia away from international standards. 
Nevertheless, the last EC Progress Report notes that a strategy for Juvenile Justice 
System Reform and its action plan were adopted in September 2009 to reverse 
the amendments adopted in 2007 for lowering the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility to 12.
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The above example of the justice sector points to shortcomings in assistance 
effectiveness, which stem principally from the complex EC procedures. For 
instance, at the time when the new NIP 2011-2013 was designed in Georgia, 
none of the projects under the previous NIP had been completed, thus making 
it impossible to draw relevant lessons.7 Moreover, as indicated by the Court of 
Auditors, a two-year programming process endangers the relevance of assistance 
in a fast-changing policy environment. Such instability also prompts a continuous 
policy dialogue with partner countries’ authorities, in order to enhance assistance 
reliance, impact and sustainability. The EU Delegation in Georgia has conducted 
such dialogue, especially in the rule of law area, where the EC is considered as 
a lead donor. However, overall the policy dialogue has been affected by ‘a lack 
of common understanding between EC and the government of Georgia on 
principles of good governance and sustainable cooperation’.8 For instance, the 
Commission’s wish to base assistance on sector policies has not always been 
shared by the Georgian authorities; Freedom House further confirms that the 
judiciary has undergone no meaningful or durable reform over the past years.9 
This has to some extent undermined the impact of assistance in the justice sector 
in the period 2005-2007. In the two other countries, the policy dialogue has been 
weaker owing to the lack of EU Delegations in the field. Delegations in Yerevan 
and Baku opened in 2008 and became fully operational in 2009.10
overall, the ENP’s impact in the field of good governance, democratisation 
and the rule of law can be assessed as contrasted, with some or major 
achievements being noted on key issues and very limited progress on other 
topics. This is evidenced both by sectoral examples and general country 
statistics and data. More specifically, the evidence provided by international 
organizations and watchdogs indicates that progress by South Caucasus 
countries in these issue areas has been slow and uneven.
7 Initial Concept Note, Potential priority areas for ENPI National Indicative Pro-
gramme (NIP) 2011-2013, retrieved at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/mid_term_
review/initial_concept_note_georgia_en.pdf.
8 Ibid.
9 Freedom House, Country Report Georgia, 2010, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=22&country=7827&year=2010.
10 European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p.52.
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Even though much remains to be done, Georgia is undoubtedly the country 
where the most significant progress has been achieved. For example, 
elections are generally considered to be free and to meet international 
standards. Nevertheless, developments since 2007 also highlight the need 
for strengthening the democratic reform process which was launched in 
2004, especially with a view to establishing a functioning system of checks 
and balances amongst power branches. More specifically, the repression 
of opposition mass demonstration in late 2007 was considered a serious 
setback in the democratisation process and tarnished respect for human 
rights. Moreover, in spite of notable progress (see box 3), Freedom House 
considers that corruption remains a challenge in the country.
Sometimes labeled a non-competitive democracy, Armenia also underwent 
a deep political crisis in the wake of the 2008 Presidential elections, the 
results of which were contested during violent riots. Although progress 
has been made over previous votes, serious deficiencies were reported in 
the 2009 municipal elections for Yerevan. The launch of a Human Rights 
Dialogue with the EU in 2009, as well as further strengthening of the 
Human Rights Defender’s independence,11 are considered as positive 
signals; yet, freedom of the press and ill-treatment in detention remain 
areas of concern. over the past two years, progress has been made in 
the justice sector reform and in the fight against corruption, although 
significant challenges still need to be addressed.
As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, it has recently moved further away 
from democratic standards. While President Aliev was reelected late 2008 
(gathering over 89% of the votes), constitutional amendments adopted by 
referendum in March 2009 removed the limits on the presidential term 
of office. Elections are not considered to be fair and free by international 
observers. Freedom of expression and press freedom have also deteriorated 
over the past two years. The judiciary is still assessed by Freedom House 
as ‘corrupt, inefficient and subservient to the executive branch’.12
11 The office of the Human Right Defender is currently supported by the EU under a 
Twinning project. Cf. http://www.pao-armenia.am/en/twinning_pline/.
12 Freedom House, Country Report Azerbaijan, 2010,
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http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7775&year=2010.
BOx 3.  FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION: CONTRASTED 
SITUATIONS, LImITED ENP CONTRIBUTION
Corruption was described as pervasive in all three South Caucasus countries 
in the early 2000’s. Reducing corruption has been continuously identified as a 
sub-priority under NIP. Progress has been tangible, yet uneven across the three 
countries.
Azerbaijan appears to be still extensively affected by corruption. On the 
one hand, the country has made significant steps forward as far as the legal 
framework is concerned. In 2004, it ratified the CoE Criminal Law Convention 
on Corruption and Civil Law Convention on Corruption and joined the CoE 
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). In 2006, the corruption-related 
provisions of the Penal Code were subject to legal amendments which aimed 
at adjusting national legislation to the requirements of the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption. These amendments included the redefinition of 
the provisions on active and passive bribery, the extension of the concept of a 
public official, an increase in sanctions for active and passive bribery and the 
criminalisation of trading in influence. As a result, as indicated by GRECO the 
number of prosecuted cases has been increasing since the establishment of the 
Anti-Corruption Department of the General Prosecutor’s Office in 2005 (e.g. 
in 2009, 176 persons were indicted for corruption-related crimes as compared 
to 35 persons in 2005). On the other hand, several major deficiencies remain 
which need to be addressed. As far as the legal framework itself is concerned, 
GRECO notes a number of shortcomings: 'Certain categories of civil servants and 
employees of institutions of local government are not captured by the notion of 
“official” -all civil servants and public employees at central and local level. The 
offer and the promise of a bribe as well as the acceptance of an offer or a promise 
do not constitute completed crimes. The criminalization of trading in influence 
shows several lacunae (...). It is to be regretted that six years after the entry into 
force of the Convention in respect of this country, Azerbaijan remains one of 
the GRECO member States to have entered nearly the maximum number of 
reservations allowed under the Convention'. However, the biggest challenge lies 
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with the enforcement of legislation. As indicated in the GRECO Third Round 
report, during the period 2005- 2010 only five persons were convicted of active 
bribery, 29 persons of passive bribery and five persons of trading in influence. 
As a result, Azerbaijan has not progressed in the fight against corruption, as 
evidenced by World Bank Governance Indicators.  It ranks 134th in Transparency 
International 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 2.4. In other 
words, the ENP has not significantly changed the country’s situation in this 
respect. This may be explained by a lack of clear focus on the fight against 
corruption under the 2007-2010 ENP. The situation may improve however 
under the 2011-2013 NIP, especially with the launch of a Twinning programme 
to support the Anti-corruption Department of the Prosecutor’s office.
Georgia offers a drastically different picture. After the Rose Revolution, the 
new authorities displayed a strong political will to eradicate corruption. They 
carried out several anti-corruption campaigns, including the prosecution of 
several high-ranking officials from the former government, the introduction of a 
new patrol police force, and the optimisation of licensing and permit regulations. 
These contributed to strengthening public confidence in the government’s anti-
corruption efforts. The Georgian government adopted key policy documents (e.g. 
the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the Action Plan for its implementation) and 
introduced new legal provisions e.g. on money laundering. Georgia also signed 
a partnership agreement with the G8 to promote transparency and combat 
corruption, and committed itself to following recommendations received from 
GRECO and the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies. Since 
the Rose Revolution, Georgia has introduced a vast array of new legislation. For 
instance, in 2004 it introduced an administrative confiscation scheme targeted 
at the unexplained wealth of officials. This provided law enforcement authorities 
with an effective tool to deprive officials and their relatives of the benefits of 
corruption. As a result, since the Rose Revolution, Georgia’s score, as measured 
by Transparency International, rose steadily from 1.8 in 2003 to 3.8 in 2010. 
Georgia now ranks 68th in the Corruption Perceptions Index as compared to 
133rd in 2004. Yet, again the contribution of the ENP is assessed to be limited. 
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No TACIS/ENPI project has directly focused on reducing corruption. However, 
the activities funded by the EC to strengthen the rule of law, inter alia through 
supporting the prosecutor’s office, have effectively accompanied the reforms 
introduced by the Georgian authorities and contributed to their consolidation.
As far as Armenia is concerned, it falls in between its two neighbours. Progress 
regarding corruption has been slow and uneven and it is difficult to assess in the 
context of the present paper. The Third Evaluation Round report by GRECO is 
indeed kept confidential. The Second Round report, published in 2006, already 
noted the lack of a clear picture of the scale of corruption and the areas it affects 
in the country. It recommended that 'the authorities of Armenia carry out the 
necessary studies in order to gain a clearer insight into the scale of corruption 
and its various features so that anti-corruption initiatives and plans can be 
targeted more effectively'.  Armenia adopted an anti-corruption strategy and 
acceded to the GRECO in 2003; a Council to fight corruption was established 
in 2004. However, even though the institutional tools were in place, the fight 
against corruption suffered from serious shortcomings pertaining either to the 
legal framework or to its application. The new anti-corruption strategy drafted 
in 2008 and adopted in 2009 (together with an action plan 2009-2012) seems to 
represent an important step forward in several respects, e.g. the involvement of 
NGOs/international organizations in the drafting process, the establishment of 
a monitoring system. Nevertheless, effective implementation remains a problem 
as shown by Armenia's rank (123rd) in the Corruption Perceptions Index. The 
contribution of the ENP is assessed to be limited. In spite of anti-corruption 
being mentioned in the sub-priorities under the NIP 2007-2010 and 2011-2013, 
no ENPI project has specifically focused on this issue area in which USAid has 
been quite active in the country. Like in Georgia, the fight against corruption is 
being tackled only indirectly by the EU, including through the Justice Reform 
sector budget support, which has however been launched much later than in 
Georgia (it was initiated late 2009 under the ENPI 2008 Action Programme).
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Reports by international watchdogs are not considered in this report as 
providing fully-fledged evaluations; rather, they are used in the table below 
to highlight the general trends which are also confirmed by other sources. 
As compared to 2004 (when they were included in the ENP), and despite 
some fluctuations over the 2004-2010 period, none of the South Caucasus 
countries has improved durably its political scores as measured by Freedom 
House, and conversely Armenia does worse in 2010 than in 2004. Georgia 
performs best, with similar scores in 2004 and 2010. Azerbaijan’s political 
rights and civil liberties scores have also remained similar (respectively 
6 and 5 out of 7). Based upon Freedom House’s typology Armenia and 
Georgia are currently considered as ‘partly free’ (although they differ in 
many respects) while Azerbaijan is classified as ‘not free’.
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010
Freedom House
Political rights 
score (out of 7)
4 6 6 6 4 4
Freedom House 
civil liberties 
score (out of 7)
4 4 5 5 4 4
transparency 
International 
corruption 
Perceptions 
Index (country 
rank out of 145)
82 123 140 134 133 68
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3.  ENP Implementation: Overall Country Assessment
3.1 Armenia
While being to some extent overshadowed by its neighbours in the 
EU’s general perceptions and in the literature on the ENP, Armenia 
offers an interesting case study for assessing ENP implementation. Like 
in Georgia, the reception of the ENP is quite positive in Armenia. on 
several occasions, Armenian leaders expressed the country’s intention to 
join the EU and a recent poll confirmed that perceptions of the EU are 
overwhelmingly positive.13 At the same time, Europeanisation has not 
remained declarative. Armenia has made good progress in setting up an 
institutional coordination framework for EU integration and in converging 
with EU trade and market-related acquis, as opposed to limited progress 
in converging with political and rule of law norms.
Progress in ENP Implementation
As already analysed, Armenia has made slow and uneven progress in the 
area of good governance, rule of law and democratisation. It underwent a 
major political crisis following the 2008 presidential elections. While the 
vote count demonstrated deficiencies of accountability and transparency, 
the post-election crisis led to the introduction of a state of emergency, 
arbitrary arrests and a number of restrictions of democratic freedoms 
and human rights, affecting in particular freedom of expression, freedom 
of assembly and media freedom. There are however recent positive 
developments, as illustrated by the setting up of a Human Rights Dialogue 
which first met in December 2009.
While good progress has been made in converging with EU economic and 
trade norms, e.g. in areas such as customs and taxation, additional efforts 
13 This is the case for 87% of respondents. Cf. http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.
php?id=152&id_type=3.
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are needed to open negotiation for a deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement, e.g. regarding sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues.
In implementing the ENP AP, Armenia is faced with two interconnected 
major issues: enforcement of legislation, as illustrated by the case of 
intellectual property, and administrative capacities. Public administration 
reform in line with EU best practices is therefore of critical importance. It 
has been incorporated as one of the main cross-cutting objectives (either 
at the central or at a regional level) in the government’s List of Actions for 
2009-2011 To Ensure Implementation of ENP RA-EU Action Plan.14
Institutional Set-up and Coordination
As far as institutional coordination is concerned, over the past five years 
Armenia has made good progress in setting up a framework dedicated to 
ENP implementation. A Coordinating Committee headed by the President 
of Armenia was established in 2006 to coordinate the activities of various 
ministries and governmental bodies with the EU institutions; a similar 
Coordination Committee was established under the Prime Minister’s 
Authority for the purposes of ENP AP implementation. As a result, the 
institutional framework is now well-developed (see table below).
Moreover, unlike some other Eastern partners, Armenia has paid specific 
attention to strengthening institutional and administrative capacities 
dedicated to ENP implementation and to bridge gaps between ENP AP 
and national reform plans.
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of Actions for 2009-2011 To Ensure Implementation 
of ENP RA-EU Action Plan, Annex to RA President order NK-68-A, 6 May 2009.
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 COORDINATION OF EU ACTIVITIES IN ARmENIA15
15 Source: Armenian Policy and Legal Advice Centre, http://www.aeplac.eu/en/
reports/capacitybuildingevents/#anchor%205.
President  
of Armenia1
Minister of Economy4
Armenian part  
of the Eu-Armenia cooperation 
committee 
Armenian part  
of the Eu-Armenia subcommittee  
on trade, Economic  
and legal Issues
Armenian part  
of the Eu-Armenia  
cooperation council
Minister of Foreign Affairs5
department of Eu 
and International 
Economic Affairs 
(Ncu)
European department
Projects 
Administration 
Agency
Prime Minister3
secretary of National 
security council2
committee for 
coordination of 
cooperation between 
Armenia and Eu 
institutions
National council  
for Eu-Armenia 
cooperation  
for the Purposes of 
Implementation  
of the ENP Eu-Armenia 
Action Plan
coordination committee 
for Eu-Armenia 
cooperation  
for the Purposes of 
Implementation  
of the ENP Eu-Armenia 
Action Plan
Interagency  
committee
1 Serzh Sargsyan
2 Artur Baghdasaryan
3 Tigran Sargsyan
4 Nerses Yeritsyan
5 Edward Nalbandian
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overall, while traditionally Russia-oriented, Armenia has become more 
and more involved in ENP implementation and in its relations with 
the EU over the past five years. Back in the mid-2000’s, EU negotiators 
already noted that “the easiest negotiation [for the ENP AP] was in case 
of Armenia, who demonstrated the “most technocratic approach” to 
the priorities reflected in Action Plans ».16 A similar approach has been 
pursued for ENP implementation when it comes to economic areas in 
which Armenia has made good progress; this is an obvious asset in the 
perspective of negotiations for a DCFTA. Yet, a strong commitment on 
the part of Armenian authorities to go ahead with political reforms is also 
needed for a successful implementation of the ENP.
16 L. Alieva, “EU and the South Caucasus”, Discussion paper Berthelsmann Foundation/
CAP, December 2006, p. 11.
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3.2 Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan displays major differences with the two other Caucasus countries 
in its relationship to the EU and therefore also in ENP implementation. 
Unlike Armenia and Georgia, it can rely upon major resources and assets 
(e.g. energy and an impressive economic performance throughout the 
2000’s17) which make the relationship less asymmetrical than in the case 
of Georgia and Armenia. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy 
is primarily based upon a balance between various powers, e.g. Russia, 
Turkey, the US and the EU. Even though it is positively perceived,18 the 
EU, then, is only one among many Azerbaijani partners. Unlike Georgia 
and Armenia, Azerbaijan does not want to become a member and 
therefore has fewer incentives to cooperate (even though membership 
is clearly distinct from the ENP). Financial support is also less attractive 
to Azerbaijan; the country has indeed become an aid donor. The ENP is 
therefore considered both as a means to maintain a balanced diplomacy 
and to raise the country’s living standards up to European ones.
These elements are well reflected in the ENP implementation which can 
be described as contrasted. on the one hand, no or limited progress 
has been made in those areas where the EU’s and Azerbaijan’s interests 
and values diverge. This applies to the rule of law, good governance and 
human rights,19 but also to areas such as public procurement under which 
equal opportunities for foreign and domestic suppliers are not ensured 
in Azerbaijan. on the other hand, there are positive developments in the 
areas where interests converge, such as energy. The country’s application 
to the WTo is also undoubtedly a driver for legal convergence; however, 
limited progress has been made in areas such as agriculture and overall 
enforcement of approximated legislation remains weak. 
17  The GDP grew by 34.5% in 2006, 11% in 2008 and 9.3% in 2009.
18  Cf. opinion polls available at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=158&id_
type=3.
19  It should be noted, however, that civil society is actively engaged in the relationship 
with the EU.
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owing to weak incentives, Azerbaijan’s record in ENP implementation 
thus appears much poorer than its neighbours’. Except for the mechanisms 
set up under the PCA, the country also lacks an institutional coordination 
scheme for ENP implementation. While negotiations are open for an 
association agreement with the EU, there is no such prospect for DCFTA 
as far as Azerbaijan is not a WTo member. ENP implementation, like the 
overall EU-Azerbaijan relations, thus seems to be driven by the country’s 
pragmatic and realist position.
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3.3 Georgia
Since the Rose revolution, Georgia has repeatedly expressed its intention 
to join Euro-Atlantic organizations. Such Westernization strategy has been 
pushed forward along with ambitious domestic reforms towards a market 
economy and democratisation. The August 2008 war and the Eastern 
Partnership have given a new impetus to the country’s aim of gaining EU 
membership.20
overall, as compared to the early 2000’s, Georgia has made significant 
progress in the reform process, even though important setbacks have also 
been noted.
However, whereas Georgia is widely considered as a frontrunner in the 
South Caucasus, both the ENP implementation and the corresponding 
institutional framework also display serious deficiencies. Those originate 
both in weak capacities and in a lack of political commitment stemming 
from different visions and priorities of reforms.
Progress in ENP Implementation
Georgia’s progress in ENP implementation can be assessed as uneven. 
Since 2004, the country has made substantial progress in respecting human 
rights, fighting corruption and improving the business environment. The 
country ranks 12th in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2011 Report.
At the same time, these achievements are fragile and reforms need to 
be consolidated. Political life is highly personalised, and political parties 
have developed around leaders rather than clear political platforms. Since 
2007, Georgia has gone through a period of political turmoil characterised 
by growing tensions between the authorities and the opposition which 
culminated in major crises, especially in Autumn 2007 when, following 
20 See e.g. the speech by Foreign Affairs Ministry G. Vashadze, New York University, 
15 April 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=50&info_
id=13048.
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massive demonstration after constitutional change, the excessive use of 
force by authorities, the introduction of a state of emergency and the 
closure of independent TV station Imedi raised serious concerns about 
the democratisation process. As far as economy is concerned, it has been 
hit by Russian embargo and more recently by the August 2008 conflict 
and the world crisis. Moreover, substantial efforts are needed to reduce 
poverty, affecting approximately 28% of the population.
ENP implementation has been a chaotic rather than linear process. Recent 
progress has been noted in the judiciary reform (previously affected by 
policy shifts) and in the democratisation process (e.g. 2010 local elections). 
Much remains to be done on social standards (either labour or health 
standards). The same holds true in the area of sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
standards, where the enforcement of legislation is problematic. To sum up, 
ENP implementation has lagged behind in those areas which were not at 
the top of the government’s reform priorities.
Institutional Set-up and Coordination
In line with its foreign policy agenda, Georgia has appointed a State 
Minister responsible for Euro-Atlantic integration. The office of the State 
Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration is responsible for 
the overall coordination and monitoring of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy action plan implementation as well as EU assistance programmes. 
Within this office, two departments are dedicated, respectively, to EU 
integration and to EU assistance. The European Integration Coordination 
Department coordinates governmental bodies’ activities in the field 
of European integration, including those under the ENP AP and the 
Eastern Partnership; it also provides assistance in the approximation of 
Georgian legislation to EU acquis. The EU Programmes Coordinating 
Department is in charge of coordinating with line Ministries and the EU 
for the preparation of assistance programmes; it also assists beneficiary 
institutions in accessing EU funds.
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While the institutional framework for EU integration and ENP 
implementation is well developed, it is affected by weak administrative 
capacities and frequent staff turnover. Although progress has been made 
over the past two years, Georgia still needs to strengthen its administrative 
capacities for a more effective ENP implementation. To that purpose, the 
EC has allocated € million 7.2 for a “Twinning and Technical Assistance 
facility to the EU-Georgia ENP AP Implementation” which will support 
the institutional development of Georgian governmental bodies through 
cooperation with EU member states’ counterpart institutions.
overall, while at the declarative level commitments to Europeanisation have 
ranked high, they have often fallen short at the time of implementation, 
for both high politics and low politics reasons. Georgia and the EU have 
sometimes put forward different priorities for the reform agenda, e.g. 
security vs. the rule of law. They also have different reform approaches. 
Clearly, Georgia has chosen a liberal approach based upon the US 
model, which sometimes contradicts the EU’s own approach and norms. 
Furthermore, ENP implementation has been affected by shifting policy 
priorities and by poor capacities.
Nevertheless, recent developments - the Eastern Partnership initiative, 
the Mobility partnership, the opening of negotiations for an association 
agreement and a possible DCFTA – constitute important incentives for 
Georgia to further progress in the reform process.
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4.  Conclusions and Recommendations
 overall, the ENP undoubtedly represents a step forward in EU policy towards 
the South Caucasus, yet its implementation highlights major differences 
between the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. 
The Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also 
significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which is 
now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS.
In the present section we analyze a few lessons which can be drawn 
from policy implementation in the field and formulate corresponding 
recommendations with a view to enhancing further policy effectiveness.
4.1.  An Individual Approach  
to Each South Caucasus Country
Political, economic, social and diplomatic developments in the South 
Caucasus in the 2000’s highlight both diverging trends and the persistence 
of tensions between the three countries. They also have different records in 
ENP implementation. However, as indicated in the first part of this paper, 
the EU has often considered South Caucasus as a region. The simultaneous 
conclusion of Action Plans (2006) and opening of negotiations for an 
Association Agreement (2010) are the best illustration of such approach.
The EU should avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to South Caucasus 
countries, pay increased attention to each country’s specificity and 
primarily (although in no way exclusively) focus on its bilateral relations 
with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. This entails further differentiating 
ENP focus and tools based upon each country’s concrete situation. This also 
entails examining the possibility of concluding different agreements.
At the same time, while a one-size-fits-all approach should be avoided, 
the EU should also take care of maintaining a common and consistent 
policy framework. To a large extent, the Eastern Partnership represents a 
47
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
huge step forward in the right direction. It harmonizes the EU offer in the 
Eastern neighbourhood and thus opens for South Caucasus countries new 
opportunities which, previously, were de facto granted only to Ukraine and 
Moldova. The additional incentives proposed to partner countries under 
the Eastern Partnership bilateral track are likely to induce substantial 
progress in ENP implementation in those South Caucasus countries which 
have strong EU aspirations, but which were previously constrained by the 
poor incentives offered by the EU.
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4.2. Targeted Regional Cooperation
While bilateral relations should form the basis of the EU’s approach, 
most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not 
limited to national borders and require regional solutions. This applies 
primarily but not exclusively to the unresolved conflicts. Issue areas such 
as transport or environment should also be addressed through regional 
cooperation mechanisms.
The EU is well placed to foster regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, 
owing to its own experience, its record in designing regional mechanisms 
and its being perceived positively across the region. It should:
•	Foster	 regional	 projects	 as	 confidence-building	measures	 to	
address indirectly the frozen conflicts and use the ENPI as 
an operational instrument to back up to political settlement 
process;
•	Under	 such	 regional	 projects,	 focus	 as	 a	 first	 step	 on	
depoliticised/technical areas of common interest with a view 
to minimising tensions;
•	Focus	on	drivers	of	change	which	play	a	critical	role	in	the	
confidence-building process: local authorities, businesses, 
civil society;
•	Encourage	 further	 the	 dialogue	 between	 South	 Caucasus	
countries under the Eastern Partnership multilateral track, 
be it under the thematic platforms, the flagship initiatives or 
the non-governmental initiatives.
•	Study	 the	possibility	 to	 reach	out	 to	Central	Asia	and	 the	
Middle-East
•	Study	the	possibility	to	involve	Turkey
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4.3.  Support to Good Governance, Democratisation  
and the Rule of Law
Under the ENP, especially since the opening of negotiations for association 
agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, trade-related issues, market 
and regulatory reform have become prominent in the EU’s relations with 
all three Caucasus countries. This is evidenced by the percentage of funds 
dedicated to these issue areas under ENPI indicative programmes for each 
country. At the same time, those priorities identified when the ENP was 
launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, do not only remain 
valid; they still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. 
The EU should:
•	Clearly	promote	the	understanding,	in	each	partner	country	
and at various levels, that good governance, democratisation 
and the rule of law are the basis of both the ENP and successful 
reforms, 
•	Develop	policy	dialogue	with	a	view	to	ensuring	that	ENP/
ENPI priorities are taken aboard by partner countries.
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4.4  Strengthen the Link between the ENP  
and Domestic Reform Processes (Capacity-Building)
In all partner countries (but even more so in the South Caucasus), ENP 
implementation has been affected by poor administrative capacities and 
weak institutional coordination. These issues are also central for the 
Eastern Partnership to be effective. In this context, the Comprehensive 
Institution-Building programmes foreseen under the Eastern Partnership 
are undoubtedly much needed. However, the focus on public administration 
reform and capacity-building should gradually be extended beyond 
those institutions which are central in the negotiation/implementation 
of Association Agreements/DCFTA. overall, the ENP is still too often 
considered as part of foreign policy and there is little awareness of the fact 
that it offers an agenda for reform. In this context the EU should:
•	Contribute	to	developing	the	understanding	among	partner	
countries' governments that the ENP and domestic reforms 
are closely interconnected and that ENP priorities should 
be incorporated in the daily work of partner countries' 
administrations,
•	Under	each	ENP/ENPI	priority	areas,	focus	on	institutional	
capacities, administration reform and capacity-building;
•	Foster	the	development	of	monitoring	systems	within	partner	
countries' governments to follow-up ENP implementation.
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4.5 Find the Appropriate mix in Assistance modalities
The EU has a wide array of instruments at its disposal, especially under 
the ENPI. At the same time, it has recently concentrated on a few tools 
such as budget support and TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly 
bring an added value, they should be better combined with tools allowing 
for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors. In particular, 
the EU should:
•	Better	 take	 into	 account	 partner	 countries'	 preferences	
for specific aid modalities and combine them with ENP 
priorities;
•	Continue	its	support	to	civil	society	through	the	EIDHR/NSA;
•	Combine	twinnings	and	budget	support	with	project	aid	which	
has resulted in some success stories in the South Caucasus 
and which is better suited to some partner countries, e.g. 
Azerbaijan;
•	Better	 take	 into	 account	 lessons	 learnt	 under	 previous	
assistance programmes and develop a culture of evaluation.
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Annexes
Annex 1.  EU Indicative Commitment under ENPI for South 
CAUCASUS COUNTRIES (€ mILLIONS)
2007-2010 2011-2013 total
Armenia 98.4 157 255.4
Azerbaijan 92 122.5 214.5
Georgia 120.4 180.29 300.69
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Annex 2.  Priority Areas of EU Assistance under ENPI  
for South Caucasus Countries
Armenia
NIP 2007-2010 NIP 2001-2013
Priority Area 1:  
support for strengthening  
of democratic structures 
and good governance
Sub-priority 1.1: Rule of law and reform 
of the judiciary
Sub-priority 1.2: Public administration 
reform, including local self government 
/ public finance management / public 
internal financial control and External 
Audit/ combat of corruption
Sub-priority 1.3: Human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, civil society, 
people-to-people contacts 
Priority area 1:  
democratic structures  
and good governance
Sub-priority 1.1: Democratic 
institutions, rule of law and reform of 
the judiciary
Sub-priority 1.2: Public administration 
reform, including local government 
and e-governance, public finance 
management, the fight against 
corruption
Sub-priority 1.3: Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, civil society 
development
Priority Area 2:  
support for regulatory 
reform and administrative 
capacity-building
Sub-priority 2.1: Approximation of 
legislation, norms and standards 
(mainly based on National Program 
for PCA implementation and reflecting 
ENP Action Plan priorities)
Sub-priority 2.2: Sector-specific 
regulatory aspects, including 
administrative capacity building
Priority area 2:  
trade and investment, 
regulatory alignment  
and reform
Sub-priority 2.1: Export and investment 
promotion, in particular through 
market and regulatory reform; 
preparations for a future deep and 
comprehensive FTA with the EU
Sub-priority 2.2: Sector-specific 
regulatory alignment and reforms in 
line with PCA/ENP AP priorities
Priority Area 3:  
support poverty reduction 
efforts
Sub-priority 3.1: Education
Sub-priority 3.2: Regional development 
and social services
Priority area 3:  
socio-economic reform  
and sustainable development
Sub-priority 3.1: Regional and rural 
development
Sub-priority 3.2: Support to the 
development of infrastructure in the 
areas of transport, energy, environment, 
electronic communications
Sub-priority 3.3: Human capital 
development, including education and 
science, social services
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Azerbaïdjan
NIP 2007-2010 NIP 2001-2013
Priority Area 1:  
support for strengthening  
of democratic structures 
and good governance
Sub-priority 1.1: Rule of law and reform 
of the judiciary
Sub-priority 1.2: Public administration 
reform, including local self government 
/ public finance management / public 
internal financial control and External 
Audit/ combat of corruption
Sub-priority 1.3: Human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, civil society, 
people to people contacts 
Priority area 1:  
democratic structures  
and good governance
Sub-priority 1.1: Democratic 
institutions, rule of law and reform of 
the judiciary
Sub-priority 1.2: Public administration 
reform, including local government, 
public finance management, the fight 
against corruption
Sub-priority 1.3: Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, civil society 
development
Priority Area 2:  
support for regulatory 
reform and administrative 
capacity-building
Sub-priority 2.1: Approximation of 
legislation, norms and standards 
(mainly based on National Program 
for PCA implementation and reflecting 
ENP Action Plan priorities)
Sub-priority 2.2: Sector-specific 
regulatory aspects, including 
administrative capacity building
Priority area 2:  
socio-Economic reform and 
sustainable development, 
trade and investment, 
regulatory approximation 
and reform
Sub-priority 2.1: Promoting trade 
and investment, in particular through 
market and regulatory reform, support 
to Azerbaijan’s preparations for 
accession to the WTO and a possible 
future DCFTA with the EU
Sub-priority 2.2: Diversification 
of Economy; regional and rural 
development
Sub-priority 2.3: Environment and 
environmental governance
Sub-priority 2.4: Human capital 
development, including education and 
training, public health
Priority Area 3:  
support poverty reduction 
efforts
Sub-priority 3.1: Education
Sub-priority 3.2: Regional development 
and social services
Priority area 3:  
socio-economic reform and 
sustainable development
Sub-priority 3.1: Strengthening of 
energy security
Sub-priority 3.2: Mobility and security, 
customs and integrated border 
management
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Georgia
NIP 2007-2010 NIP 2001-2013
Priority Area 1: support for 
democratic development, 
rule of law and governance
Sub-priority 1.1: Democracy, human 
rights, civil society development
Sub-priority 1.2: Rule of law and 
judicial reform
Sub-priority 1.3: Good governance, 
public finance reform and 
administrative capacity building
Priority area 1: democratic 
development, rule of law, 
good governance
Sub-priority 1.1: Media freedom, 
political pluralism, human rights, civil 
society development 
Sub-priority 1.2: Justice sector reform 
Sub-priority 1.3: Public finance 
management and public administration 
reform 
Priority Area 2: support for 
economic development and 
ENP AP implementation
Sub-priority 2.1: Promoting external 
trade and improving the investment 
climate
Sub-priority 2.2: Supporting PCA/ENP 
AP implementation and regulatory 
reforms
Sub-Priority 2.3: Education, including 
vocational education, science and 
people-to-people contacts/exchange
Priority area 2: trade and 
investment, regulatory 
alignment and reform
Sub-priority 2.1: Export and investment 
promotion, in particular through 
market and regulatory reform; 
preparations for a future deep and 
comprehensive FTA with the EU
Sub-priority 2.2: Sector-specific 
regulatory alignment and reforms in 
line with PCA/ENP AP priorities
Priority Area 3: support for 
poverty reduction and social 
reforms
Sub-priority 3.1: Strengthening social 
reforms in health and social protection
Sub-priority 3.2: Rural and regional 
development
Priority area 3: regional 
development, sustainable 
economic and social 
development, poverty 
reduction 
Sub-priority 3.1: Social reforms and 
social protection
Sub-priority 3.2: Regional development 
and sustainable development, including 
environmental protection
Sub-priority 3.3: Education, skills 
development and mobility
Priority Area 4:  
support for peaceful 
settlement of Georgia’s 
internal conflicts
Priority area 4:  
support for peaceful 
settlement of conflicts
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